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ESSAY

Family Ties: Salman and the
Scope of Insider Trading
Jill E. Fisch*
Introduction
This fall, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear argument in Salman v. United
States to consider the scope of insider trading liability under the federal securities
laws. 1 Specifically, the Court will consider the legal standard for tippee liability,
a standard that it first articulated in its 1983 decision in Dirks v. SEC. 2
Dirks considered whether a research analyst should be liable for insider
trading in connection with trades that were based on material nonpublic
information that he received about corporate fraudulent practices via a tip from
an insider. 3 As the Court explained, the federal securities laws do not prohibit
all trading on material nonpublic information. 4 Instead, the circumstances
under which the tip occurred are critical in determining the tippee’s liability for
insider trading. Specifically, the Court in Dirks adopted a two-step analysis. For
a tippee to be liable, the tipper/insider must breach a fiduciary duty and the
tippee must “know[] or should know that there has been a breach.” 5 Dirks further
explained that an insider breaches a fiduciary duty by disclosing inside
information only when “the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure.” 6 Such a personal benefit can arise when the
* Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
2. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
3. Id. at 649.
4. See id. at 654 (“[T]here is no general duty to disclose before trading on material nonpublic
information . . . .”).
5. Id. at 660.
6. Id. at 662. Notably, the fact that the insider has acted for personal gain creates the breach
of fiduciary duty that renders the insider’s disclosure wrongful. It is well established that
when an insider takes corporate information for personal use, he misappropriates the
information. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (“The undisclosed
misappropration of [a company’s confidential] information . . . constitutes fraud akin to
embezzlement . . . .”). The misappropriation is no different when the insider intends to
make a gift of the information rather than trading on it directly, in the same way that an
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insider receives something tangible, such as money or services, in exchange for
providing information, or “when an insider makes a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend.” 7
The government has applied the Dirks personal benefit test aggressively to
bring insider trading charges against tippees in a variety of circumstances. 8 The
facts of Salman are different, however, from cases in which the courts have
struggled to determine the existence of a quid pro quo for the tip or the nature
of the relationship between tipper and tippee. 9 Salman involves the gift of
confidential information by an insider to a close family member. 10 The question
presented for the Court is whether this close family relationship is sufficient to
establish liability under the personal benefit test. 11
This Essay argues that Dirks correctly concluded that, because of the close
ties between family members, an insider who provides material nonpublic
information to a family member for the purpose of securities trading receives a

7.
8.

9.

10.

11.

employee steals from his employer even if the thief is not keeping the property for
himself but instead giving it away to his friends. See, e.g., People v. Jensen, 654 N.E.2d
1237, 1239 (N.Y. 1995) (“A person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent
to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.”
(emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05(1) (McKinney 1995))).
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64.
See, e.g., Brian Neil Hoffman & Kevin C. McAdam, Holland & Hart Discuss Newman Cert.,
a Potential Tipping Point for Insider Trading Liability, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 25, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/25/newman-cert-a-potential-tippingpoint-for-insider-trading-liability (“For decades after Dirks, the DOJ and SEC employed
the personal benefit test expansively to pursue tippees who had received inside
information from friends, relatives, or even casual acquaintances in exchange for
virtually nothing tangible in return. Indeed, in recent years, the DOJ’s enforcement
focused on long tipping chains, where supposed material nonpublic information passed
through numerous individuals having only vague connections to each other before the
alleged insider trading occurred.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
242 (2015) (rejecting the argument that “the Government may prove the receipt of a
personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social
nature”); SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2010) (descibing the court as “tasked”
with determining whether Mark Cuban had a “relationship of ‘trust and confidence’”
with Mamma.com (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997)); Jon
Eisenberg, “Friends” Who Trade on Inside Information: How United States v. Newman
Changes the Law, K&L GATES (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.klgates.com/friends-whotrade-on-inside-information-how-united-states-v-newman-changes-the-law-04-202015 (stating that the Government’s position was that “virtually anyone who is an
acquaintance can be labeled a friend” for purposes of the Dirks test).
United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899
(2016) (“Maher’s disclosure of confidential information to Michael, knowing that he
intended to trade on it, was precisely the ‘gift of confidential information to a trading
relative’ that Dirks envisioned.” (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983))).
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (U.S. Nov. 10,
2015), 2015 WL 7180648, at *i (raising this question).
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personal benefit and has breached his or her fiduciary duty. 12 The facts of
Salman, as a result, do not present a close legal question but instead fall within
the core of the legal standard established by Dirks. Whatever parameters apply
to information sharing among Wall Street analysts, investment professionals,
or hedge fund managers, the Salman decision can be affirmed on the basis of a
simple principle: family is different.
Additionally, policies underlying the family member cases are critically
different from those involving information obtained by professional traders
through a chain of Wall Street sources. Many of the informational advantages
obtained by professional traders are legitimately obtained through research, and
an ambiguous liability standard would have a chilling effect on their attempts to
gather and use that information. 13 In contrast, there is no ambiguity created by
a rule that imposes liability when an insider makes a gift of corporate
information to his brother.
I.

The Salman Case

Bassam Yacoub Salman was convicted of insider trading based on
information he received from his fiancée’s brother, Michael Kara, with whom
he had become “fast friends.” 14 Michael had received the information from his
brother, Maher Kara, an insider at Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking
group. The evidence at trial established that Salman knew Maher was the source
of the information. 15 The evidence further established that Michael and Maher
enjoyed a close family relationship and that Salman knew of this relationship. 16
Salman appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence against him was
insufficient under the legal standard applied by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Newman. 17 Specifically, Salman argued that, under the Newman standard,
“evidence of a friendship or familial relationship between tipper and tippee,
standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate that the tipper received a
12. This Essay does not address the issue of whether a defendant could rebut the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Government’s case by establishing an estranged or hostile family relationship; the
question is not raised by the facts of Salman.
See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089.
Id.
Id. at 1089-90.
Id. at 1090 (citing United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 242 (2015)). Newman involved two portfolio managers at hedge funds who, according
to the Government, received and traded on inside information traded by a cohort of
analysts who, in turn, received that information from corporate insiders. 773 F.3d at 442.
The Second Circuit issued its decision in Newman after Salman’s initial conviction. See
Salman, 792 F.3d at 1090 (describing Salman’s effort to have the court apply Newman’s
holding to his case).
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benefit.” 18 Instead, Salman argued that, as in Newman, the Government was
required to prove that Maher received a tangible benefit in exchange for
providing Michael with inside information. 19
The Ninth Circuit upheld Salman’s conviction but suggested that Salman
had plausibly identified a tension between its reading of Dirks and that of the
Second Circuit in United States v. Newman, 20 a tension that may have contributed
to the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision to grant certiorari. 21 In fact,
however, no such tension exists. The Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks requires
that the tipper receive a personal benefit. Dirks further explains that the personal
benefit requirement can be met either through receipt of a tangible benefit or as
the result of making a gift. 22
In Newman, the court found the evidence as to personal benefit insufficient
under both lines of analysis. First, although the court expressly noted that the
requirement of a personal benefit was a “permissive” standard, it concluded that
there was no evidence that the insiders had received any type of benefit from
tipping. 23 Second, the court specifically rejected the claim that the evidence
established a close relationship between tipper and tippee, and that, in fact, the
evidence undermined the Government’s claim that the tippers intended the
information to consititute a gift. 24
Importantly, Newman’s extensive inquiry into the nature of the relationship
between tipper and tippee sought to determine whether the relationships
involved were sufficiently close to infer that the tippers had intended the
disclosures as gifts. The Newman court found that, because the relationships
involved merely casual acquaintances, the Government had not introduced
sufficient evidence from which the jury could make this inference. 25
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

24.
25.

Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093.
Id.
Id.; 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
Ironically, Judge Jed Rakoff, author of the Salman opinon, was a judge in the Southern
District of New York sitting by designation who, had he been deciding a case in his own
court, would have lacked the power to “decline to follow” the language in Newman with
which he disagreed. See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093 (“To the extent Newman can be read to
go so far, we decline to follow it.”).
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1983). The language in Dirks does not appear to intend
these examples to constitute an exhaustive list of ways to satisfy the personal benefit
requirement. In theory, the Government may meet the personal benefit requirement in
another way, but that issue was not before the Court.
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. Although the Government argued that the Dell insider received
“career advice” and that this consistuted a personal benefit, the court found that the socalled advice “was little more than the encouragement one would generally expect of a
fellow alumnus or casual acquaintance.” Id. at 453.
See, e.g., id. at 453 (stating that the testimony “undermin[ed] any inference that Choi
intended to make a ‘gift’”).
Id. at 452.
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Accordingly, Newman does not address the issue whether making a gift confers
a personal benefit on the tipper or constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.
In contrast, the Government in Salman presented direct evidence both of the
close family relationship between Maher and Michael and that Maher intended
to make a gift of the information. 26 The evidence included testimony that
“Michael helped pay for Maher’s college, that he stood in for their deceased
father at Maher’s wedding, and . . . that Michael coached Maher in basic science
to help him succeed at his job.” 27 Maher “testified that he disclosed the material
nonpublic information for the purpose of benefitting and providing for his
brother Michael.” 28 In light of this evidence, the only remaining question for the
Salman court was whether Maher received a personal benefit as a result of
making a gift to his brother. On this point, Dirks is clear. A tipper receives a
personal benefit when he discloses inside information as a gift to a close friend
or family member. 29 As the next Part explains, there are sound reasons for this
conclusion.
II. Gifts and the Personal Benefit Test
Dirks identified two possible sources of a personal benefit for an insider who
discloses material nonpublic information: an exchange and a gift. 30 This analysis
reflects a more general legal distinction between a commercial exchange and a
gift. 31 Critically, both confer a personal benefit on the tipper, but they do so in
different ways. The critical component of an exchange is reciprocity: the benefit
to the tipper from an exchange is the money or property that he receives. 32 For
example, in the insider trading trial of Zvi Goffer, the tipper testified that he
provided information about upcoming acquisitions in exchange for envelopes
of cash. 33
The motivation for gifts is more complex. Scholars have identified a variety
of reasons for gift-giving. One is implicit reciprocity—the expectation that the
26. See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089, 1094 (“[T]he Government presented direct evidence that the

disclosure was intended as a gift of market-sensitive information.”).
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1094.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1983).
Id. at 664.
See Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 567 (identifying the legal distinction between gifts and commercial
exchanges).
32. Cf. id. at 569-70 (arguing that, because the degree of reciprocation “varies considerably,”
it is useful to recognize “two conceptual categories, gifts and exchanges”).
33. See Bob Van Voris, Ex-Lawyer Tells Goffer Jury He Traded 3Com Merger Tips for Cash,
(May 19, 2011,
9:01
PM
PDT),
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-19/goffer-trial-witness-says-hetraded-merger-tips-for-cash-filled-envelopes.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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donee will make a gift in return. 34 But people make gifts for many other reasons.
As Eric Posner explains, gifting may be motivated by the giftor’s desire to
increase his reputation or status. 35 Giving gifts may increase the donor’s power
or influence; expensive gifts, in particular, may create a sense of obligation in
the giftee. 36 Exchanging gifts can also create or enhance trust relationships
between giver and recipient. 37
The mixed motivation behind gifting complicates the analysis of personal
benefit. Perhaps most problematic for purposes of insider trading analysis is
altruistic giving. To the extent that gifts are motivated by altruism, it seems
difficult to argue that they confer a personal benefit on the giftor. Altruism,
however, has a variety of possible meanings, 38 and the literature on gifts
recognizes that even gifts that are ostensibly motivated by altruism may increase
the donor’s personal utility. 39 Gifts may, for example, satisfy the donor’s sense
of moral obligation or give the donor a “warm glow” from his conduct. 40 While
some “pure” altruism may be motivated by a wholly unselfish desire to benefit
the recipient without regard to the giftor’s personal utility, “impure” altruism
results in the giftor “gain[ing] utility from the act of giving.” 41
To the extent that an insider’s disclosure reflects a selfish gift in the sense
that it increases the insider’s personal utility, such a gift is properly understood
as conferring a personal benefit on the tipper within the meaning of Dirks.
Notably, the language in Dirks might also be understood to address the potential
for pure altruism by limiting the scope of gifts that trigger potential liability to
those that are made to close friends and family members. 42 Essentially, Dirks can
be read to imply that gifts to close friends and family constitute, at least partially,
selfish gifting.
34. See, e.g., Donald Cox, Motives for Private Income Transfers, 95 J. POL. ECON. 508, 510 (1987)

(using modeling to conclude that most gifts are motivated by the exchange hypothesis).

35. Posner, supra note 31, at 574-76.
36. See id. at 577.
37. Id. (“[C]ommon sense suggests that the main reason for exchanging gifts is to create,

enhance, or reaffirm relations of trust.”).

38. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests?: The Distributive and Welfare
39.

40.

41.

42.

Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641, 665-66 (1999) (discussing various
forms of altruism).
See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1406 (1991) (arguing that “all gifts partake of some form
of self-interest”).
Fried, supra note 38, at 665. See also James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to
Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 465-68 (1990) (modeling a
warm-glow theory of chariable giving).
Andreoni, supra note 40, at 473 (concluding that a model of impure altruism leads to
predictions that are more consistent with actual giving behavior); see also Richard A.
Posner, Reply to Critics of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1796, 1815 (1998) (distinguishing between “selfish altruism” and “selfless altruism”).
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
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Salman is a good example. Maher’s disclosures to his brother were motivated
by love, a desire to help his brother, and a desire to build a relationship of trust
and closeness. Michael in turn reciprocated by publicly conveying to Maher his
gratitude, thereby enhancing Maher’s status and reputation. For example, the
Salman opinion recounts how Michael gave a toast at Maher’s wedding,
describing Maher as “one of the most generous human beings he knows.” 43
Maher wept. 44
The Dirks rule reflects the facts that gifting is a common component of close
relationships and that, among close relationships, families are distinctive. 45
Scholars have written about the close ties supplied by kinship. 46 Evidence
suggests that people give more to family members than to strangers and that the
motivation for such gifts is complex but motivated, at least in part, by a
perceived personal benefit on the part of the giftor. 47 The rule announced in
Dirks for tippee liability correctly recognizes both the frequency of such gifts
and the role the giftor’s self interest plays in the scope of the personal benefit
requirement.
III. Policy Considerations
The conduct in Salman falls within the core of illegal tipping as defined by
the Court in Dirks. Like Dirks, Salman leaves the outer limits of when a gift
involves a personal benefit unclear, recognizing merely that an insider receives
a personal benefit when he gives confidential information to a trading friend or
relative. 48 Cases involving family members are the easy insider trading cases
because, for the reasons set out above, a court can reasonably infer the insider’s
personal benefit from the mere fact of the family relationship.
43. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899

(2016).

44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, “Law &” Gratuitious Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 935

(noting that most gifts are among family members).

46. See, e.g., Steven L. Del Sesto, Book Review, 65 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 132, 132-33 (1974)

(reviewing FRANCIS A.J. IANNI & ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, A FAMILY BUSINESS: KINSHIP
AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN ORGANIZED CRIME (1972) (describing the importance of kinship
in organized crime)).
47. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 34, at 537-39 (identifying gifts by parents to their children as
motivated by an exchange-based expectation of future support); Melanie B. Leslie,
Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551,
570-86 (1999) (exploring the role of trust and reciprocity in family gifts made through
bequests); Maria Porter & Abi Adams, For Love or Reward?: Characterising Preferences for
Giving to Parents in an Experimental Setting, ECON. J. EARLY VIEW 19-20 (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12248/epdf (summarizing results of
experimental studies suggesting that people give more to parents than strangers, but that
the motivation for such gifts is not pure altruism).
48. See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1094.
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How far does that principle extend? In Newman, the legal question was
whether the corporate insiders had disclosed nonpublic information for
personal benefit. 49 The Government argued that personal benefit could be
inferred because of the relationship between the insiders and the tippees. 50 The
court in Newman did not reject this argument but applied a practical constraint:
a personal benefit can only be presumed when the insider’s relationship to the
friend or relative is “meaningfully close.” 51 As the Newman court recognized,
friends and acquaintances can vary in closeness, and there is no reason to
presume that an insider receives a personal benefit from making a gift to a casual
acquaintance any more than from making a gift to a complete stranger. 52
Imposing liability for disclosures to casual acquaintances would make Dirks’
personal benefit requirement meaningless. 53
And there are good reasons for retaining the Dirks limitation. Dirks was
concerned with providing sufficient predictability to allow participants in the
securities markets to gather and trade on information without undue concern
about liability exposure. The Dirks court adopted the personal benefit test
“because it worried that a vague and uncertain standard of liability would inhibit
the work of investment analysts like Mr. Dirks.” 54 As the Court recognized in
Dirks, a legal rule that imposes liability on the basis of an information disparity
would chill socially valuable efforts by investors to gather information and use
it. These efforts are socially valuable because they lead to better informed prices,
enhancing market efficiency and discipline. 55
The Dirks personal benefit rule is practical because it prohibits tippees from
using information in situations where the circumstances of the tip are
inherently problematic, either because the tippee has induced the tip through an
exchange or because of the tippee’s relationship with the tipper. In neither of the
Dirks scenarios, then, is the tippee likely to confuse the disclosure with
information obtained through legitimate research. 56
49. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

56.

(2015) (“The circumstantial evidence in this case was simply too thin to warrant the
inference that the corporate insiders received any personal benefit in exchange for their
tips.”).
Id. at 452.
Id.
See id.
See id. (“If this was a ‘benefit,’ practically anything would qualify.”).
Michael Perino, The Gift of Inside Information, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 12, 2014, 2:56
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/the-gift-of-inside-information.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of
Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 140-46 (1984)
(arguing against applying insider trading regulation to analysts because of their role in
enhancing market efficiency).
Cf. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899
(2016) (“[C]orporate insiders, in the many conversations they typically have with stock
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Moreover, Dirks’ limitations do not result in a regulatory void. Although
professional traders may obtain information advantages that are unfair—such as
when a corporate official selectively discloses material non-public
information—corporate officials are in the best position to prevent these
situations by avoiding the selective disclosures that give professional traders
advantages over other investors. 57 As a result, regulatory efforts in this context
are better directed at the source of the information, as reflected in Regulation
Fair Disclosure, which, importantly, does not impose liability on downstream
recipients of selectively-disclosed information. 58
Conclusion
Developments in the securities markets raise difficult questions about the
circumstances under which investor efforts to obtain and use information to
gain trading advantages are appropriate. Professional traders have systematic
advantages over small investors, and their trading may raise concerns about
fairness and equal access. In an environment in which some investors, such as
hedge funds, have high-powered incentives to develop and exploit
informational advantages, the stakes are high and the lines between legitimate
and illegitmate trading activity are blurred.
The complexity of regulating insider trading appropriately in this market
environment should not be confused with an easy case like Salman. Salman is
about a family member stealing corporate information by making a gift of that
information to his brother. Simply put, family is different.

analysts, often accidentally or mistakenly disclose material information that is not
immediately available to the public.”).
57. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation,
26 GA. L. REV. 179, 246-51 (1991) (arguing that insider trading regulation should impose
liability on corporate officials for the insider trading profits earned by their tippees to
deter sources from revealing material nonpublic information).
58. See Jill E. Fisch, Newman Reins in Criminal Prosecution of Remote Tippees for Insider
Trading,
CLS
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(Jan.
28,
2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/28/newman-reins-in-criminalprosecution-of-remote-tippees-for-insider-trading (arguing that the government could
make greater use of Regulation Fair Disclosure to address selective disclosure by
corporate insiders).
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